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Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States: The Nadir of 
the U.S. Trade Relief Process 
Kevin C. Kennedy· 
In contrast to the preceding article, Professor Kennedy argues that execu-
tive discretion in trade remedies often destroys the protection for domestic indus-
try that the U. S. trade relief process intends to give. As a background for his 
discussion, Professor Kennedy uses the protracted litigation over Zenith Radio 
Corporation's challenge to a Commerce Department settlement of massive an-
tidumping duties imposed against Japanese television importers. Professor Ken-
nedy concludes that the Carter Administration s settlement of all claims for 
antidumping duties, for approximately one-half of the duties originally imposed, 
denied meaningful relief to American industries. Professor Kennedy asserts 
Congress intended to limit executive discretion in antidumping law under the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, but that the courts in Zenith Radio miscon-
strued congressional intent. Professor Kennedy concludes that Congress should 
expressly limit executive discretion in trade relief in legislation such as the Om-
nibus Trade Bill. 
On July 2, 1987, the final chapter to one of the most bitterly 
fought international trade legal battles was written. On that day the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) delivered its last 
opinion in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 1 affirming the Court of 
International Trade's decision2 refusing to assess damages in favor 
of the United States on a 250,000 dollar injunction bond filed by 
Zenith with the court. The Federal Circuit's opinion brought to a 
close an international trade dispute spanning some sixteen years, 
ending Zenith's challenge to a 1980 settlement agreement between 
the Secretary of Commerce and various importers of Japanese color 
teleVIsions. 
With the Zenith case history as backdrop, this article examines 
how the exercise of discretionary executive branch power, motivated 
largely by considerations of economic and political expediency, is al-
lowed to subvert the U.S. international trade relief process. Zenith's 
experience is not an isolated one, but has been repeated for similar 
• Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law; J.D. 1977, Wayne State Uni-
versity School of Law; LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School. The author was a law clerk to 
Senior Judge Herbert N. Maletz of the U.S. Court of International Trade from 1982-84, 
and a trial attorney with the Justice Department from 1984·85 where he was responsible 
for international trade litigation. 
I 823 F .2d 518 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
2 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States. 643 F. Supp. 1133, 1138 (Cl. Int'l Trade 
1986), aff'd, 823 F.2d 518 (Fed. CiT. 1987). 
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reasons in other trade relief contexts with other domestic industries. 
What is most regrettable in the Zenith case, however, is that the exec-
utive branch received an unwarranted helping hand from the judici-
ary. As a consequence, a case which should have been heard on its 
merits was nipped in the bud by courts insufficiently sensitive to the 
will of Congress. 
I. The Zenith Radio Corp. Background 
On March 10, 1971, the Treasury Department issued a dumping 
finding3 that monochrome and color television sets from Japan were 
being sold in the United States at less than fair value.4 From the date 
of this 1971 finding until 1979, most of the antidumping duties due 
on. these television receivers went uncollected.5 Congress deplored 
this practice of administrative neglect and so it overhauled the an-
tidumping duty law in 1979.6 Responsibility for administering the 
antidumping duty law was moved from the Treasury to the Com-
merce Department in 1980' and on March 28, 1980, the Commerce 
Department conducted its first administrative review of the 1971 
Treasury dumping finding. s On April 28, 1980, prior to completing 
!I T.D. 71-76, 5 Cust. B. & Dec. 151,36 Fed. Reg. 4597 (1971). 
4 The Treasury Department's dumping finding was issued pursuant to § 201(a) of 
the Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, § 201(a), 42 Stat. II, 11. repealed by Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 150, 193. This finding, coupled 
with a findir.g of injury to an American industry of competing merchandise, results in the 
imposition of dumping duties equal to the margin of dumping. A finding of sales at less 
than fair value is generally made when the price of merchandise in the home market is 
greater than the price for such merchandise in the U.S. market. For a discussion of the 
antidumping duty law, see Barshefsky & Cunningham, The Prosecution of Antidumping Actions 
Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,6 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 307 (1981); Horlick, 
Summary of Procedures Under the United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 58 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 828 (1984); PottS & Lyons, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Administrative 
Policy and Practice in Antidumping Investigations, 6 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 483 (1981). 
5 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1282, 1283 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1981). 
6 In the report of the Senate Committee on Finance to the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979, the "dismal performance" of the Treasury Department in collecting antidumping 
duties was noted. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77 (1979) [hereinafter S. REP. 
No. 249]. The upshot was transfer of responsibility for administering the antidumping 
and countervailing duty laws from Treasury to the Commerce Department in 1980. See 
Reorg. Plan No.3 of 1979, § 5(a)(I)(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979); Exec. Order No. 
12,188,45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). This transfer of authority amounted to little more than 
old wine in a new bottle, however, because most of the Treasury personnel responsible for 
administering the antidumping duty law transferred to the Commerce Department. Nev-
ertheless. the generally vigorous enforcement record of the Commerce Department under 
the antidumping duty law over the past seven years shows that Congress' .message did not 
fall on deaf ears. 
7 Reorg. Plan No.3 of 1979, § 5(a)(I)(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979); Exec. Order 
No. 12,188,45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). 
8 45 Fed. Reg. 20,511 (1980). Regular administrative reviews of outstanding coun-
tervailing and antidumping duty orders are required by section 751 of the Tariff Act of 
1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361,46 Stat. 590, added by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. 
No. 96-39, § 101,93 Stat. 144, 175 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1982 & 
Supp. III 1985». In these reviews the actual margins of dumping are calculated for the 
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that section 751 administrative review, the Secretary of Commerce 
announced that he had settled all claims for antidumping duties aris-
ing from entries of the subject television sets from July 1, 1973, to 
March 31, 1979.9 The United States estimated that the potential 
amount of dumping duties which could be collected was approxi-
mately 138.7 million dollars,1O and agreed to a settlement figure of 
77 million dollars. I I Zenith, a domestic manufacturer of television 
sets, placed the figure of potential antidumping duties due in the 
hundreds of millions. 12 
In the face of this settlement, Zenith immediately brought an 
action in the U.S. Customs Court, the predecessor court to the U.S. 
Court of International Trade (CIT), challenging the lawfulness of 
the settlement agreement. 13 The company's contention was that the 
implementation of the settlement agreement would result in the un-
lawful forgiving of hundreds of millions of dollars in antidumping 
duties owed by Zenith's competitors. 14 Zenith alleged as a first cause 
of action that the settlement was ultra vires the Secretary's authority 
under 19 U .S.C. section 1617,15 and, thus, illegal and void. 16 As a 
second cause of action Zenith alleged that even if authority existed 
under 19 U .S.C. section 1617 for the settlement, this settlement was 
tainted because the government officials who recommended settle-
ment did so in an arbitrary, capricious, and bad faith manner, having 
based their decision on political and other irrelevant 
period immediately preceding the review and actual duties are assessed on that basis. That 
dumping margin is then used for the purpose of assessing estimated duties on imports of 
affected merchandise during that prospective period until the next administrative review, 
at which time actual dumping duties are again imposed with any excess estimated dumping 
duties being refunded to the importer. 
9 Zenith Radio corp., 509 F. Supp. at 1284. 
10 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 673 F.2d 1254, 1256 (C.C.P.A.), 
C/!rt. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982). 
11 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 1347, 1348 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1981 ). 
12 [d., (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 505 F. Supp. 216, 217 (Ct. Int'l 
Trade 1980». 
13 Zenith filed its complaint on May 28, 1980, and followed it with a verified com-
plaint on June 27,1980. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 505 F. Supp. 216, 217 (Ct. 
Int'l Trade 1980). 
14 [d. 
15 That section provides: 
Upon a request by a customs officer, United States attorney, or any special 
attorney, having charge of any claim arising under the customs laws, showing 
the facts upon which such claim is based, the probabilities of a recovery and 
the terms upon which the same may be compromised, the Secretary of the 
Treasury is authorized to compromise such claim, if such action shall be rec-
ommended by the General Counsel for the Department of the Treasury. 
All functions of the Secretary of the Treasury and the General Counsel of the Depart-
ment of the Treasury were transferred to the Secretary of Commerce and the General 
Counsel of the Department of Commerce insofar as those functions relate to the settle-
ment of claims for antidumping duties. Reorg. Plan No.3, § 5(a)(I)(G), 44 Fed. Reg. 
69,273 (1979). 
16 505 F. Supp. at 217-18. 
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considerations. 17 
In parallel litigation, the Committee to Preserve American Color 
Television (COMPACT), a trade association representing members 
of the U.S. television manufacturing industry and its workers, 
brought an identical challenge. IS Prior to the April 28, 1980, settle-
ment agreement, COMPACT filed an action in the District Court for 
the District of Columbia challenging the delayed enforcement of the 
outstanding dumping finding of March 10, 1971. 19 The district 
court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and an appeal was taken to 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 20 While 
that appeal was pending, the settlement agreement was executed. 
On May 9, 1980, the D.C. Circuit enjoined implementation of the 
agreement pending appea1.21 On October 10, 1980, the Customs 
Courts Act of 1980 was enacted,22 vesting exclusive jurisdiction over 
international trade matters (such as the legal challenge brought by 
Zenith and COMPACT) in the Court of International Trade.23 
Against this legislative backdrop, on February 5, 1981, COMPACT 
moved for a stay of proceedings in the court of appeals pending the 
filing of a new complaint in the CIT and requested a determination 
of the CIT's jurisdiction.24 The allegations in COMPACT's com-
17 Id. at 218. 
18 COMPACT v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 341, 342 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981), aff'd, 
706 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983). 
19 See id. at 343 n.4. 
20ld. 
21 Id.; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 505 F. Supp. 217, 218 (Ct. Int'l 
Trade 1980). 
22 Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
23 The Customs Courts Act of 1980 was designed "to improve the federal judicial 
machinery by clarifying and revising certain provisions of title 28, United States Code, 
relating to the judiciary and judicial review of international trade matters .... " H.R. REP. 
No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. I, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3729 
[hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1235). Among the revisions was the enlargement of the juris-
diction of the U.S. Customs Court, renamed the U.S. Court ofInternational Trade. Born 
out of a legislative concern that litigants were being frustrated in their attempts to obtain 
judicial review, the Customs Courts Act of 1980 sought to remedy this problem by clarify-
ing the Customs Court's subject matter jurisdiction and expanding its powers by giving it 
the same powers in law and equity enjoyed by the district courts. See id. at 19-20; 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1585 (1982). 
Prior to 1980 the Customs Court lacked power to issue injunctive relief. Under the 
law that existed prior to 1980, it had "become increasingly more difficult to determine, in 
advance, whether or not a particular case [feU) within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Cus-
toms Court .... The result [was) considerable jurisdictional confusion .... " S. REP. No. 
466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1979). See generally Kennedy, A Proposal to Abolish the U.S. 
Court o/International Trade, 4 DICK.]' INT'L L. 13 (1985); Cohen, The "ResiduaIJurisdiction" 0/ 
the Court o/International Trade Under the Customs Courts Act 0/1980,26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 471 
(1981); Cohen, Recent Decisions 0/ the Court o/International Trade Relating to Jurisdiction: A 
Primer and Critique, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 700 (1984); Rodino, The Customs Courts Act 0/1980, 
26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 459 (1981); Vance, The UnrealizedJurisdiction 0/28 U.S.c. § 1581(i): 
A View from the Plaintiff's Bar, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 793 (1984). 
24 See COMPACT V. United States, 527 F. Supp. 341, 343 n.4 (Ct. InCI Trade 1981). 
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plaint were virtually identical to those made by Zenith.25 In an ap-
parent attempt to whipsaw the government, both Zenith and 
COMPACT resisted efforts by the United States to consolidate the 
two actions.26 Consequently, the two suits did not proceed in 
lockstep.27 
Faced with the potential dissolution of the injunction issued by 
the D.C. Circuit in favor ofCOMPACT,28 Zenith moved for a prelim-
inary injun.ction in the CIT in late 1980.29 Applying the traditional 
four-part test30 for determining the propriety of injunctive relief 
pendente lite,31 the CIT concluded with virtually no factual discus-
sion or legal analysis that Zenith was likely to prevail on the merits of 
its complaint.32 Similarly, with respect to irreparable injury the 
court concluded that Zenith would not only lose its right to judicial 
review if the settlement agreement was implemented,33 but that its 
competitors would be tremendously rewarded by the allegedly illegal 
forgiveness of hundreds of millions of dollars in dumping duties, all 
to Zenith's detriment.34 As for the balance of hardships factor, the 
CIT properly rejected the government's bootstrap argument that the 
Department of Justice had relied to its detriment on the settlement 
The government conceded that the Court of International Trade had jurisdiction over 
Zenith's and COMPACT's actions. See Zenith Radio Corp., 505 F. Supp. at 219 n.2. 
25 See COMPACT, 527 F. Supp. at 342; COMPACT v. United States, 706 F.2d 1574, 
1576 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983). 
26 COMPACT, 706 F.2d at 1576. 
27 [d. 
28 As the Court of International Trade observed in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United 
States, 505 F. Supp. 216 (1980): 
[T]he enactment of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 makes imminent the 
dissolution by the D.C. Circuit of its injunction in view of the exclusivity of 
subject matter jurisdiction which Congress has now vested in this court .... 
In this posture the injunction pending appeal could be dissolved by the D.C. 
Circuit at any time. 
505 F. Supp. at 218. 
29 [d. at 216. 
30 In order to prevail the petitioner must show: 
( 1) that there is a substantial likelihood that the petitioner will prevail on the 
merits; (2) that without the relief requested the petitioner will be irreparably 
injured; (3) that the issuance of the relief requested will not substantially 
harm other interested parties; and (4) that the public interest would be 
served by the relief requested. 
[d. at 218 (footnote omitted). 
31 [d. at 218-20. 
32 [d. at 219. 
33 [d. The loss of the right to judicial review seems to be a matter more properly 
addressed in an All Writs Act injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) than in a Rule 65 
injunction. 
34 505 F. Supp. at 219. The court rejected the government's argument that Zenith's 
current competitive position vis-a-vis its Japanese counterparts could not be adversely af-
fected because the settlement agreement only covered past entries of television sets. [d. 
The CIT's response was that Congress believed that domestic manufacturers such as 
Zenith could be harmed by nonenforcement of the antidumping duty laws. [d. Neverthe-
less, to equate Congress' view with the immediate and irreparable harm contemplated 
under rule 65 seems to be a somewhat sophistic twist on the concept of irreparable injury. 
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agreement by voluntarily dismissing with prejudice two pending col-
lection actions.35 Regarding the public interest factor, the court con-
cluded that the public interest "lies in the faithful execution by the 
Executive Branch of the laws enacted by Congress .... [P]laintiff has 
raised serious issues concerning the Executive Branch's exercise of 
its responsibilities under the antidumping law .... "36 Accordingly, 
the CIT preliminarily enjoined implementation of the settlement 
agreement on December 9, 1980.37 
Flush with victory, and apparently buoyed by the CIT's conclu-
sion that Zenith had made out a substantial case, at least on its sec-
ond cause of action,38 Zenith moved for partial summary judgment 
on its first cause of action that the settlement agreement was ultra 
vires the Secretary's authority under 19 U.S.C. section 1617.39 The 
government cross-moved for summary judgment.40 In an opinion 
issued on February 27, 1981,41 the CIT concluded that the plain lan-
guage of section 617, which enables the Secretary to compromise 
"any claim arising under the customs laws," meant that the United 
States possessed a claim against the importers of Japanese television 
sets which could be compromised "even though the exact amount of 
the claim had not been fixed through the process of liquidation. "42 
As for Zenith's contention that enactment of section 751 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930, as added by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,43 
amounted to an implied repeal of the Secretary's authority to settle 
antidumping duty cases,44 the court found no implied repeal of sec-
tion 617 in section 751 and, more importantly, was able to give effect 
to both statutes.45 
The CIT found sections 751 and 617 to be two distinct statutes 
with two different purposes, the former dealing with the assessment 
of antidumping duty claims that are not settled, and the latter deal-
35 [d. at 220. 
36 [d. 
37 [d. at 216, 220-21. 
38 [d. at 219. The court specifically noted that its decision to issue the preliminary 
injunction was made "without reference to plaintiff's first cause of action .... " [d. 
39 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1282, 1283 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1981). 
40 [d. 
41 [d. at 1282. . 
42 [d. at 1286 (footnote omitted). "Liquidation" is the final duty assessment phase in 
the entry process. Most of the entries which were the subject of Zenith's suit were unliqui-
dated. [d. at 1284 n.7. 
43 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1982 & Supp. III). That section requires the Commerce Depart-
ment to periodically review all outstanding antidumping and countervailing duty orders 
and to assess actual dumping and countervailing duties on all unliquidated entries of mer-
chandise subject to such orders. 
44 509 F. Supp. at 1286. Zenith argued in effect that Congress' purpose in enacting 
§ 751 was the speedy and efficient collection of antidumping duties, the implication being 
that the settlement of antidumping duty claims is prohibited. See id. at 1286. 
45 [d. at 1286-87. 
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ing with such claims that are settled.46 Moreover, the CIT added 
that to the extent settlement expedites the duty collection process, 
section 617 was fully consonant with the congressional intent behind 
enactment of section 75l.47 The CIT accordingly denied Zenith's 
motion for partial summary judgment, granted the government's 
motion as to Zenith's first cause of action, and denied the govern-
ment's motion with respect to Zenith's second cause of action based 
on a genuine issue of material fact raised by Zenith at the hearing on 
its motion for a preliminary injunction.48 
Realizing that it was faced with potentially protracted and vexing 
discovery on Zenith's remaining cause of action, the government de-
cided to apply pressure of its own by filing a motion on June 9, 1981, 
to require Zenith to post security pursuant to rule 65(c) of the CIT.49 
The government's motion was made seven months after the CIT 
granted Zenith's request for a preliminary injunction. Interestingly, 
the government never requested the posting of security in the litiga-
tion between it and COMPACT, even though an injunction was also 
issued there. 50 
The government requested security in the amount of 11.5 mil-
lion dollars, an amount equivalent to fifteen percent interest for one 
year.51 Zenith resisted the posting of any security, arguing that the 
i~unction was issued pursuant to the All Writs Act rather than CIT 
rule 65.52 The court agreed that its earlier injunction was in effect an 
All Writs Act injunction, thereby dispensing with the security re-
quirement.53 Although the CIT concluded that no security was re-
quired, the court oddly enough went on to observe that under rule 
65(c) it nevertheless had the discretion to require security in a nomi-
nal amount, adding that a prohibitively high security requirement 
might preclude Zenith's right to judicial review. 54 Costing Zenith 
out of the litigation was, of course, one of the government's reasons 
for insisting on such a large amount of security from Zenith, 
although the amount it requested was reasonable under the circum-
stances. In the end, the CIT required Zenith to post security of 
250,000 dollars pursuant to rule 65(c)-from which the government 
46 [d. at 1287. 
47 [d. at 1287-88. 
48 /d. at 1288; see Zenith Radio Corp. v. United State~, 505 F. Supp. 216, 219 (Ct. Int'l 
Trade 1980). 
49 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 1347, 1348 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1981). CIT rule 65(c) is identical to FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
50 [d. at 1348 n.2. 
51 [d. at 1348. 
52 [d. Security is not required for injunctions issued pursuant to the All Writs Act. 
See id. at 1349, and cases cited therein. 
53 [d. 
54 [d. at 1350. 
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could be made whole if it was eventually determined that the United 
States had been wrongfully enjoined. 
By requiring what under the circumstances was only nominal se-
curity, the CIT was beginning to reveal with whom its sympathies lay. 
Why the court shifted in midstream from its conclusion that no se-
curity was required to a requirement that only nominal security 
would be imposed on Zenith is difficult to fathom, unless the CIT 
was attempting to forestall any serious thought on the part of the 
government to appeal the court's security decision. Recalling the 
CIT's observation that the government took seven months before it 
even sought security from Zenith, coupled with the fact that the 
United States never asked for security in the COMPACT litigation 
pending in the D.C. Circuit, 55 it may well have been that the CIT 
doubted the government's good faith in seeking security. In an eq-
uity context that factor arguably could be important, but whether or 
not that would be a legitimate consideration in requiring Zenith to 
post only nominal security is debatable, given rule 65(c)'s express 
language that security shall be required in all cases where a prelimi-
nary injunction is issued. That considerations such as the govern-
ment's lack of good faith figured in the court's decision to set the 
amount of security so low seems less debatable. 
In a reprise of the Zenith motions for summary judgment and for 
preliminary injunction, COMPACT filed identical motions with the 
CIT in late 1981 and 1982.56 COMPACT's motion for partial sum-
mary judgment made essentially the same arguments advanced by 
Zenith in its motion for partial judgment.57 The CIT, once again 
resorting to the plain language of section 617, found that section 617 
authorizes the government to compromise "any claim arising under 
customs laws," including the present claim for dumping duties. 58 
Rejecting COMPACT's contention that the only claims contem-
plated as an appropriate subject for settlement were claims for fines, 
55 [d. at 1348 n.2. 
56 COMPACT v. United States. 551 F. Supp. 1142 (Ct. Int'I Trade 1982), aff'd, 706 
F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.), cerl. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983); COMPACT v. United States, 527 F. 
Supp. 341 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981), aff'd, 706 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.), cerl. denied, 464 U.S. 825 
( 1983). 
57 Taking a slightly different tack, COMPACT argued that § 617 only authorized the 
compromise of claims for duties which were penal in nature, such as fines, penalties, and 
forfeitures. 527 F. Supp. at 344. Because antidumping duties are not penal in nature, 
COMPACT contended, they could not be settled under authority of § 617. /d. Zenith had 
argued in its motion for partial summary judgment that only liquidated claims for duties 
could be settled under § 617, and that because the claim for antidumping duties at issue 
here was in the main unliquidated, no authority existed for the settlement agreement 
under § 617. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1282, 1284 (Ct. Int'l 
Trade 1981). COMPACT did make the same argument as Zenith. however. that the com-
promise of a claim for antidumping duties under § 617 was repugnant to its right to ad-
ministrative review under § 751. See 527 F. Supp. at 349-50. This argument was also 
rejected by the CIT. 527 F. Supp. at 350. 
58 COMPACT v. United States. 527 F. Supp. at 343. 
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penalties, and forfeitures (that is, claims penal in nature), the court 
concluded that when Congress intended to so limit the Secretary's 
authority, it did so expressly, noting that such limiting language was 
included in section 616 of the Tariff Act of 1930.59 Accordingly, the 
court denied COMPACT's motion and granted the government's 
cross-motion for summary judgment on that cause of action.60 
The CIT's denial of COMPACT's motion certainly came as no 
surprise in view of the court's earlier denial of Zenith's motion on 
similar grounds. Nevertheless, a dark cloud was looming on the ho-
rizon for Zenith and COMPACT which neither they nor even the 
government had forecast. Four months after the CIT's decision in 
COMPACT, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) was to 
deal a mortal blow to these plaintiffs' actions. 
Undaunted by its lack of success on the ments of its first cause of 
action, Zenith cranked up the engines of discovery in an attempt to 
prove its claim of alleged arbitrary, capricious, and bad faith conduct 
by the government in settling these claims. In the course of an ap-
peal from a CIT discovery order to the CCPA (a predecessor court to 
the Federal Circuit), the CCPA raised the issue of subject matter ju-
risdiction sua sponte.61 After examining Zenith's complaint, the 
CCPA concluded that Zenith was attempting to press inquiry into the 
merits of and motives for the settlement, a prohibited area of inquiry 
in the court's view.62 At most, the court explained, Zenith could 
challenge procedural irregularities in reaching the settlement; how-
ever other avenues of inquiry were beyond a court's jurisdiction.63 
According to the court: 
In no previous case has a court assumed jurisdiction at the behest of 
a third party to review the merits of a settlement agreement entered 
into by the Government with its [the third party's] competitor. The 
only precedent we find for setting aside a settlement is where the 
court has found that the complainant was deprived of its statutory 
right to a hearing on the merits of the underlying case prior to set-
tlement. ... [D]iscretionary action cannot be reviewed if "there is no 
law to apply." ... No situation is more within the category of "no 
law to apply" than the multifaceted judgmental decision to settle a 
claim. Thus, the substance of the settlement is clearly outside the 
scope of judicial review.64 
Invoking the "no law to apply" rule of judicial review,65 the 
CCPA added that in matters entrusted to executive branch discre-
59 527 F. Supp. at 344-45. 
60 [d. at 350. 
61 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 673 F.2d 1254, 1258 n.7 
(C.C.P.A.), mt. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982). 
62 [d. at 1264. 
63 [d. at 1265. 
64 [d. at 1262 (citations omitted). 
65 [d. at 1262 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
410 (1971». 
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tion, "[t]he only law to apply here is set forth as procedural require-
ments in 19 V.S.C. § 1617, and any legal wrong to Zenith must be 
based on the Secretary's violation of the procedures set forth. 
therein."66 The substance, merits, and motives for entering into the 
settlement agreement were outside the scope of judicial review.67 
Because Zenith never challenged the procedural regularity of the 
Secretary's action in reaching the settlement agreement, the CCPA 
reversed and remanded the case with directions to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.68 
The serious difficulty with the CCPA's decision is that no ac-
knowledgment was made of Zenith's right to an administrative re-
view of the outstanding dumping finding under section 751 and to 
judicial review of the agency's action thereunder pursuant to 19 
V.S.C. section 1516a. Such review would have gone to the merits. 
By reading section 617 settlements as outside the scope of section 
751 administrative determinations,69 the CCPA unraveled a poten-
tially knotty problem for the government but at the same time ig-
nored congressional intent. In view of Congress' desire to afford 
American industry a greater role in the administrative process by 
which antidumping duties are assessed,7? as well as its goal of intro-
ducing more procedural safeguards into this process,71 one wonders 
whether the CCPA's delivery of section 617 from the jaws of section 
751 was premised more on semantics and sophistry than sound legal 
reasoning. In this connection, the CCPA would have done well to 
heed the advice of Judge Learned Hand that 
it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurispru-
dence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember 
that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, 
whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to 
their meaning.72 
Following this stunning defeat, Zenith filed a petition for a writ 
of certiorari. While Zenith's petition was pending, the CIT denied 
the government's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction on 
the ground that implementation of the settlement agreement would 
moot the controversy and thereby prevent Supreme Court review.73 
66Id. 
67 /d. at 1262-63. 
68 Id. at 1265. 
69 The CCPA explained that 19 U.S.C. § 1516a provides for judicial review of certain 
agency "detenninations," including those made under § 751, but that § 617 settlements 
do not result in "determinations" within the contemplation of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. Conse-
quently, no judicial review of the factual or legal bases of § 617 settlements was pennissi-
ble. Id. at 1260. 
70 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 6, at 81 ("[section 751] provides a greater role for 
domestic interested parties and introduces more procedural safeguards"). 
71Id. 
72 Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404, 409 (1945). 
78 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 3 Ct. Int'l Trade 243,244 (1982). 
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After the Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 18, 1982,74 
the CIT dissolved the preliminary injunction.75 
The baton was now passed to COMPACT which returned to the 
CIT immediately before dissolution of the Zenith injunction to sal-
vage its and Zenith's seemingly doomed cases with motions for leave 
to amend its complaint arid for a preliminary injunction.76 Conclud-
ing that COMPACT could not succeed on the merits of its amended 
complaint, the CIT denied COMPACT's motion for a preliminary 
injunction.77 In COMPACT's five-count amended complaint, the 
first and fifth counts tracked the first and second causes of action in 
COMPACT'S original complaint, that is, ultra vires and bad faith 
conduct by the Secretary of Commerce.78 Taking its cue from the 
CCPA's Montgomery Ward decision, COMPACT's second, third, and 
fourth counts alleged procedural irregularities by the government in 
reaching the settlement. 79 
Specifically, in Count II of its amended complaint COMPACT 
contended that the requirement of section 617 that a report and rec-
ommendation be submitted to the Secretary of Commerce had not 
been satisfied.80 The CIT had little difficulty, however, in finding 
that the reports, letters, and memoranda submitted by the Commis-
sioner of Customs, the General Counsel of the Department of Com-
merce, and other government officials satisfied section 617's' 
documentation requirements. To COMPACT's argument that a sin-
gle report is required under section 617, the court reminded the 
plaintiff that the reporting requirement was designed to ensure that 
the Secretary made an informed settlement decision.8l "Given this 
consideration," the CIT concluded, "the various letters and memo-
randa prepared in contemplation of a section 617 settlement, either 
severally or collectively, satisfy the procedural requirements of sec-
tion 617."82 
In Count III of its amended complaint, COMPACT challenged 
the factual accuracy of the General Counsel's settlement recommen-
dation. Declining COMPACT's invitation to scrutinize the recom-
mendation, the court noted that such an inquiry would go to the 
74 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 459 U.S. 943 (1982). 
75 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 201, 202 (1982). The in-
junction was dissolved on November 15, 1982. 
76 COMPACT v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 1142 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), aff'd, 706 
F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.), (trl. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983). 
77 Id. at 1144. 
78 Id. The allegation of ultra vires conduct by the Secretary had earlier been dis-
missed by the CIT, see COMPACT v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 341, 350 (Ct. Int') Trade 
1981), aff'd, 706 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.), ctTI. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983), and was also re-
jected by the CCPA in Montgomery Ward. 
79 551 F. Supp. at 1145. 
80ld. 
81 Id. at 1147. 
82 Id. 
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merits and substance of the General Counsel's recommendation, a 
prohibited area of inquiry under the Montgomery Ward decision.83 
With regard to Count IV's allegations of procedural irregularity in-
sofar as whether the Secretary actually considered the report or rec-
ommendation, the CIT once again fell back on Montgomery Ward's 
admonition not to probe the mental processes of the Secretary.84 
Given that all of the reports and the recommendation antedated the 
Secretary's decision to settle, the strong presumption of administra-
tive regularity applied.85 Turning finally to Count V of the amended 
complaint, the court concluded that allegations of bad faith conduct 
were in essence an attack on the motives for settlement, an area of 
inquiry beyond the CIT'sjurisdiction.86 Having thus concluded that 
there was little, if any, likelihood of success on the merits of COM-
PACT's amended complaint, the CIT denied its motion for a prelim-
inary injunction.87 The CIT consolidated the hearing on the motion 
with trial on the merits and granted judgment in favor of the govern-
ment on all counts.88 The lessons of Montgomery Ward were clearly 
not lost on the CIT. Arguably, the CIT applied those lessons with a 
vengeance. 
With so much at stake, COMPACT took an appeal to the Federal 
Circuit. 89 Even without the benefit of hindsight, this appeal must 
surely have seemed a futile gesture to COMPACT. Putting to rest 
any lingering doubts as to whether it had decided otherwise in Mont-
gomery Ward, the Federal Circuit reiterated that section 617 includes 
the power to settle antidumping duty claims.90 As for Counts II 
through IV, the Federal Circuit reassured the CIT that the latter's 
. reading of the Montgomery Ward decision was on the mark.9l Parrot-
ing the rationale of the CIT for rejecting those three counts, the Fed-
eral Circuit affirmed the decision.92 Finally, regarding Count V's bad 
faith allegations, the CAFC repeated its earlier statement in Montgom-
ery Ward that "[p]roving that the estimate in the report ... was lower 
than what Zenith considers reasonable does not destroy the lawful-
ness of [the Secretary's] decision."93 With that conclusion, the Fed-
eral Circuit affirmed the CIT and dissolved the irUunction pending 
83/d. 
841d. 
851d. 
861d. 
87/d. 
88 /d. at 1142. 
89 COMPACT v. United States, 706 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 
(1983). 
90 /d. at 1577. 
91/d. 
92 /d. at 1577-78. 
93 /d. at 1579 (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 673 F.2d 
1254, 1264 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982». 
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appea1.94 Apparently none the wiser from Zenith's experience with 
the Supreme Court, COMPACT likewise petitioned for a writ of cer-
tiorari and met the same fate as Zenith on October 3, 1983.95 
The enmity with which these cases were litigated manifested it-
self in the post-judgment proceedings brought by the United States 
to recover against the 250,000 dollar bond deposited by Zenith in 
connection with the grant of its motion for a preliminary injunction. 
Whether the government's decision to move against the bond was an 
economically rational one is questionable in view of the protracted 
nature of the post-judgment proceedings compared to the modest 
amount of the bond.96 In any event, after dissolution of the Zenith 
injunction, the government moved for assessment of damages on the 
injunction bond. The government sought to recover the lost interest 
on the delayed implementation of the settlement agreemenL97 Not 
surprisingly, Zenith opposed the motion on grounds that interest 
had accrued in favor of the government under the settlement agree-
ment, and thus no damages were incurred.98 Furthermore, Zenith 
contended that even if there were damages, the government had 
failed to enforce its rights to collect interest, and that failure 
amounted to a failure to mitigate damages.99 
After learning of an intra governmental dispute between the 
Commerce Department and the Customs Service over whether the 
government should have sought interest from the importers, Zenith 
served the United States with interrogatories and requests for pro-
duction of documents relating to the substance of all communica-
tions concerning whether interest would or should accrue under the 
settlement agreemenL lOO Although the United States responded in 
part to Zenith's discovery request, it asserted privilege with respect 
to discovery of information concerning three meetings held in July 
1983 among the Commerce Department, Justice Department, and 
Customs Service, at which a decision was reached not to seek interest 
from the importers. 101 Zenith then made a motion to compel discov-
ery on the grounds that the United States had waived its privileges by 
94 Id. at 1579. 
95 COMPACT v. United States, 464 U.S. 825 (1983). 
96 It may be the case that the government's decision to proceed against the injunction 
bond was premised on considerations which transcended the instant litigation, such as the 
deterrent effect the government's action would have on future litigants contemplating 
seeking injunctive relief against the United States. Unfortunately, if that was the govern-
ment's thinking, the relatively insignificant amount of the injunction bond required of 
Zenith arguably made this case the wrong one for sending a signal to persons entertaining 
the thought of suing the United States for injunctive relief. 
97 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
98Id. 
99Id. 
100 [d. at 1578-79. 
101 Id. at 1579. 
HeinOnline -- 13 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg.  238 1988
238 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 13 
seeking damages. 102 After an in camera inspection of the sought-after 
documents, the CIT agreed that the government had waived its privi-
leges with the exception of one document and one sentence in an-
other document. IO!! 
In reversing the CIT, the Federal Circuit concluded that Zenith 
had not made a sufficient showing of need for the documents in 
question or that the opinions sought would be particularly probative 
for purposes of Zenith's defense. 104 More importantly, however, the 
question of whether the government was entitled to interest under 
the settlement agreement turned upon an interpretation of that 
agreement which, as the CAFC noted, was an issue of law. 105 Thus, 
although the CAFC agreed with the CIT as far as the applicable legal 
standard was concerned, it disagreed with the CIT's application of 
that standard to the given facts. 106 
More than a year after the Federal Circuit's reversal of the CIT's 
discovery order and more than three years after the government filed 
its motion to assess damages, the CIT issued its decision on that mo-
tion. As an initial matter, the court discussed the two general ap-
proaches federal courts have taken in assessing damages against an 
injunction bond. lo7 The Page Communication approach adopted by 
the D.C. Circuit states that even where rule 65(c) requires a bond, it 
does not mean that the court is required to award damages on the 
bond if the injunction is dissolved. The court must still avoid inequi-
table results. lOS The Coyne-Delany approach adopted by the 7th Cir-
cuit states that when a defendant sustains damages because of a 
wrongfully issued preliminary injunction, the plaintiff should "nor-
mally be required to pay the damages, at least up to the limit of the 
bond."lo9 Both of these approaches recognize the equitable discre-
tion which the trial court retains in making any such assessment. I 10 
Against that legal backdrop, the CIT denied the government's mo-
tion on the ground that the CCPA's Montgomery Ward decision de-
cided a novel jurisdictional question "contrary to what Zenith 
legitimately could have expected." 111 In the court's view, that deci-
sion effectively constituted a change in the law, a reason previously 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 1579. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 1443, 1444-46 
(Ct. In!,1 Trade), rev'd, 764 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
104 764 F.2d at 1580-81. 
105 Id. at 1579-80. 
106/d. 
107 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 643 F. Supp. 1133, 1135-36 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1986), aff'd, 823 F.2d 518 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
1081d. 
109/d. 
1101d. at 1136-37. For a discussion of damage awards against injunction bonds, see 
Note, Recovery for Wrongful Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c), 99 HARV. L. REV. 828 
(1986). 
III 643 F. Supp. at 1138. 
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cited by other courts for refusing to assess damages on an injunction 
bond. 112 
Seven years after it all began, the Federal Circuit penned the last 
chapter in what had truly become a "lengthy saga."1l3 On the gov-
ernment's appeal from the CIT's denial of its motion for assessment 
of damages, the CAFC applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of re-
view and affirmed. 1 14 Taking issue with the CIT's characterization of 
the CAFC's Montgomery Ward decision as a "change in the law,"115 
adding that had it made the initial decision whether to assess dam-
ages on the bond it might have weighed factors differently than the 
CIT, the Federal Circuit nevertheless concluded that on balance the 
CIT had not abused its discretion in reaching the conclusion that it 
did.l 16 
Zenith had won a small, but bittersweet, battle. Zenith, together 
with COMPACT, should have won the war. As discussed in the next 
part of this article, the CIT and the CAFC both misinterpreted the 
antidumping duty law when dismissing Zenith~s and COMPACT's 
first causes of action. At this stage, unfortunately, if they want to 
press their fight further, Zenith and COMPACT will have to do so in 
the halls of Congress, for it is only from there that their nemesis in 
this legal challenge, discretionary executive branch power in the field 
of international trade, can be effectively curbed. The need for flexi-
bility and discretion in resolving delicate international trade issues is 
understandable. When the exercise of discretion fails to comport 
with justice, propriety, and the law, however, and instead shows 
favor and unrestraint, such discretion becomes license and is 
unexcusable. 
112 See id. at 1138, and cases cited therein. The CIT explained: 
Because of the jurisdictional ruling in Montgomery Ward, Zenith will never 
have an opportunity to prove its allegation, which the court has found non-
frivolous, that the $77 million settlement was tainted by bad faith. Under all 
the circumstances, however, it would be manifestly unfair to add a rule 65(c) . 
insult to the jurisdictional injury. The $77 million settlement has never been 
vindicated on the merits. Rather, this court was held to lack jurisdiction to 
review the merits of the settlement. If Zenith lost the opportunity to be 
heard on its good faith claim of governmental impropriety, it should not be 
required to pay damages to the government as well. 
[d. at 1138. 
WI Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 823 F.2d 518 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
114 [d. at 522. 
115 The Federal Circuit commented as follows: 
The Montgomery Ward decision was not a "change in the law" in the sense that 
term has been used in other cases that upheld a district court's denial of 
damages resulting from a preliminary iryunction. . .. On the other hand, the 
decision did announce and apply a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the 
Court ofInternational Trade that had not theretofor been stated. The result 
was to preclude Zenith from litigating its contention, which the Court of In-
ternational Trade "found nonfrivolous, that the $77 million settlement was 
tainted by bad faith." 
[d. at 522 (citations omitted). 
116 Id. at 522. 
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II. The Zenith Settlement: Discretionary Power As License 
In the field of foreign affairs the President has enjoyed wide lati-
tude in dealing with international emergencies and in formulating 
U.S. foreign policy} 17 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 118 a 
unanimous Supreme Court declared that the President possesses 
"plenary and exclusive power ... in the field of international rela-
tions."119 While the President may be vested with an inherent for-
eign affairs power,120 no such power exists in the field of 
international trade. The Constitution expressly vests in Congress, 
not the executive branch, exclusive power to regulate foreign trade 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 121 
When it enacts legislation regulating international trade, Con-
gress does, of course, delegate to the executive branch discretionary 
powers in order to implement its legislative scheme. 122 Yet even in 
117 See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1972); Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 656 (1981). 
118 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
119 [d. at 320. 
120 But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,635-36 n.2 (1952) 
Qackson, J., concurring). For a criticism of Justice Sutherland's theory of Presidential 
power outlined in the Curtiss-Wright decision, see Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign 
Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1,26-28 (1972); Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis 
of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE LJ. 467 (1946). 
121 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cIs. 1 & 3. See United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 
655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955), where the Fourth Circuit 
noted: 
[W]hile the President has certain inherent powers under the Constitution ... 
the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce is not among the 
powers incident to the Presidential office, but is expressly vested by the Con-
stitution in the Congress. 
204 F.2d at 659. Notwithstanding this textual commitment of the foreign commerce 
power to Congress, "[i]t is impossible to extricate the question of distribution of powers 
over foreign economic affairs from the general problem of distribution of powers over 
foreign affairs in United States governmental and constitutional practice." J. JACKSON & 
W. DAVEY, CASES ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 77 (1986). 
Nevertheless, "even though the conduct of general foreign policy ... may rest largely in 
the Executive Branch, when it comes to economic foreign policy, Congress does not hesi-
tate to assert itself." /d. at 1 05. 
122 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (originally enacted as Agricul-
tural Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-540, § 204, 70 Stat. 188, 200); 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) 
(1982) (originally enacted as Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337(g), 46 Stat. 590, 
704); id. § 1861 (1982) (originally enacted as Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 
87-794, 76 Stat. 872); id. §§ 2251-2252 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (originally enacted as 
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201, 88 Stat. 1978,2011-24); id. § 2411 (Supp. 
III 1985) (originally enacted as Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301. 88 Stat. 
1978, 2041-43); id. §§ 2461-2466 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (originally enacted as Trade 
and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 502-508,98 Stat. 2948, 3018-23); 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1701-1706 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (originally enacted as International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1984». For recent decisions 
interpreting the President's power under most of these trade statutes, see Florsheim Shoe 
Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Generalized System of Preferences); 
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (International Emergency Economic Pow-
ers Act); Amer. Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States, 
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those instances where Congress has given the executive branch 
broad discretionary powers, Congress has sometimes warned against 
the exercise of that power for reasons other than the merits. For ex-
ample, in a revealing remark the Senate Finance Committee's report 
on section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 noted that "relief ought not 
to be denied for reasons that have nothing to do with the merits of 
the case as determined under U.S. law .... [N]o U.S. industry which 
has suffered serious injury should be cut off from relief for foreign 
policy reasons."123 These remarks evidence a congressional desire, 
if not directive, that the administrative decision-making process be 
depoliticized. But if that is so, then how is it possible to explain the 
President's decision to grant some form of relief in only eleven of 
thirty-two affirmative section 201 cases from 1974 to 1986? 124 At 
least a partial answer must be pressure group politics. 125 
By contrast with section 201 escape clause relief, when Congress 
amended section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 in 1974, it delegated 
authority to the President to disapprove affirmative section 337 de-
terminations "for policy reasons."126 The Senate Finance Commit-
tee Report on the Trade Act of 1974 explained why Congress felt it 
necessary to give the President discretionary disapproval authority: 
The President would often be able to best see the impact which the 
relief ordered by the [International Trade] Commission may have 
upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the 
United States economy, the production of like or directly competi-
tive articles in the United States, and United States consumers. 127 
Yet explanations such as these still are cold comfort to domestic 
industries which find themselves cut off from trade relief, even after 
they have successfully established their entitlement to relief, by the 
exercise of discretionary power by the executive branch which short-
circuits the administrative process. While the flexibility that comes 
588 F. Supp. 427 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962); 
Duracell Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade CO.mm'n, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (section 337 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930); Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974). For a discussion of the discretionary executive 
branch power under three of these trade statutes, see Kennedy, Presidential Authority Under 
Section 337, Section 301, and the Escape Clause: The Case for Less Discretion, 20 CORNELL INT'L 
LJ. 127 (1987). . 
123 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 205 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 7268 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1298]. 
124 See Applebaum, Section 201 (The Escape Clause), and Section 406 of the Trade Act of 
1974, in UNITED STATES IMPORT RELIEF LAws, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAw AND POLICY 
137, 158 (Practicing Law Institute 1985). 
125 See Kennedy, supra note 122, at 147, 150, where the author concludes that "[n]o 
clear pattern emerges from these affirmative presidential relief determinations .... [A] 
possible explanation ... is the size of the industry in question, both domestically and 
worldwide. The President is more likely to withhold relief when a larger industry is 
involved." 
126 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982). 
127 S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 123, at 199, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 7211, 7331-32. . 
HeinOnline -- 13 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg.  242 1988
242 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 13 
with discretionary power is undoubtedly welcomed and closely em-
braced by the executive branch, the unpredictability that necessarily 
follows from the exercise of that power gives rise to a perception on 
the part of U.S. domestic industries that U.S. trade laws are arbitrar-
ily and capriciously administered. Witness the Zenith debacle. An 
observer cannot help but be struck by the thought that it was interest 
group politics, not the merits of a trade relief case, that informed the 
Zenith decision-making process. The disturbing upshot of episodes 
such as Zenith and COMPACT, of course, is that American manufac-
turers and producers may reject outright the statutory mechanisms 
created by Congress for securing trade relief in preference to extra-
legal (and arguably unconstitutional) trade relief devices such as vol-
untary restraint agreements. 128 
Congress has responded in a small way by introducing legisla-
tion that eliminates or substantially curtails executive branch discre-
tion to deny trade relief under sections 20 I and 301 of the Trade Act 
of 1974,129 (An executive branch decision to deny trade relief is, of 
course, tantamount to settling a trade relief case in favor of the for-
eign industry.) Amending the various trade relief laws by eliminat-
ing or circumscribing the discretionary power of the executive 
branch to either grant or withhold trade relief or to settle trade cases 
would be a major step in the direction of restoring regularity and 
predictability to an administrative process riven with unpredictability 
and incoherence. The elimination of most executive branch discre-
tion under U.S. trade laws would put an end to the license that has 
crept into these trade relief proceedings to the detriment of U.S. do-
mestic industry. The elimination of most executive branch discre-
tionary power would also be in the best interests of representative 
democracy for the simple reason that public confidence in the regu-
larity and rationality of government would be enhanced. Con-
versely, when meritorious trade relief petitions are thwarted by the 
exercise of executive branch discretion after an affirmative agency 
determination that was the product of a regularized administrative 
proceeding, U.S. industries can only shake their collective head in 
frustration and disbelief. 
The debate over eliminating executive branch discretionary 
power under U.S. trade relieflaws has been discussed elsewhere and 
will not be repeated here,130 More importantly, as the next part of 
the article explores, no such law reform would have been necessary 
in order for Zenith and COMPACT to have prevailed in their law-
128 See, e.g., More Voluntary Restraint Agreements Said Solution to U. S. Trade Imbalance, 4 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) at 490 (Apr. 8, 1987); Industry Leaders Urge Administration to Take Tougher 
Imports Stance, Call/or More VRAs, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 461 (Apr. 9, 1986). 
129 See, e.g., Senate Omnibus Trade Act of 1987, S. 490, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); 
H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201,132 CONGo REc. 3173 (1986). 
130 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 122. 
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suits. The law as it existed then, even though it gave and still gives 
the executive branch discretionary power to settle antidumping duty 
cases, nevertheless curtailed the exercise of that power sufficiently so 
that those litigants should have had a hearing on the merits of their 
complaint. 
III. Discretionary Power to Settle Antidumping Duty Cases 
Under most of the U.S. trade relieflaws, Congress has given the 
President broad discretionary powers to grant or withhold relief}SI 
In notable contrast, however, in 1979 Congress trimmed the breadth 
of that discretionary power considerably under the antidumping 
(AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws,ls2 far and away the most 
widely used and most discretion-free of all the U.S. trade relief stat-
utes. ISS Indeed, the statutory provision affording interested parties 
judicial review of AD and CVD determinations l34 represents a clear 
congressional expression that regularity and rationality should be 
the hallmarks of an AD or CVD administrative proceeding. ls5 
Despite the absence generally of broad discretionary executive 
branch power under the AD and CVD laws, such cases may still be 
settled at the administrative level by the Commerce Department,IS6 
bypassing the regularized administrative process. Nevertheless, spe-
cific statutory criteria must be satisfied before an AD or CVD investi-
gation may be suspended. ls7 In the legislative history of the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979, Congress made it abundantly clear that 
shortcircuiting the AD and CVD administrative process was to be the 
rare exception: 
The suspension provision is intended to permit rapid and pragmatic 
resolutions of countervailing duty cases. However, suspension is an 
unusual action which should not become the normal means of dis-
posing of cases. The Committee intends that investigations be sus-
pended only when that action serves the interests of the public and 
the domestic industry affected. For this reason, the authority tO'suspend 
investigations is narrowly circumscribed. ISS 
131 See Uf., where the President's discretionary powers under § 337 of the Tariff Act of 
1930. and §§ 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 are analyzed. 
132 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671.1677g (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
133 From 1980 through 1986. over 500 antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty 
(CVD) petitions were filed with the Commerce Department. See Illegal and Unfair Foreign 
Trade Practices in Interstate and Foreign Commerce: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce. 99th Cong .. 2d Sess. 18 (1986) 
(testimony of Malcolm Baldrige. Secretary of Commerce). 
134 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
135 The right to judicial review under the AD and CVD laws is to be contrasted with 
§§ 201 and 301 trade relief where there is no right to judicial review. See Maple Leaf Fish 
Co. v. United States. 762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
136 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(c). 1673(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
137/d. §§ 1671c(b). 1671c(d). 1673c(b). 1673c(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
138 S. REP. No. 249. supra note 6. at 54 (emphasis added). In keeping with the letter 
and spirit of the suspension agreement provisions. Commerce views them as the exception 
rather than the rule. See Homer & Bello. U.S. Import Law and Policy Series: Suspension and 
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This congressional sentiment was underscored in 1984. Under 
the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Congress tightened the termina-
tion provisions of the AD and CVD laws by directing the Commerce 
Department to consider three public interest factors l39 and to con-
sult with potentially affected consumer, industry, and worker 
groupsl40 before suspending an AD or CVD investigation. But even 
in 1980 when Zenith filed its action in the CIT, it should have been 
evident to the reviewing courts that the "no law to apply" rule had 
no applicability whatsoever to an action challenging the settlement 
of an outstanding antidumping duty finding. Indeed, the CIT and 
the CAFC should have understood that when Congress enacted the 
AD and CVD provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, it was 
repealing pro tanto section 617. 
First of all, compare Zenith with those cases in which the CAFC 
has relied upon the "no law to apply" rule. For example, in Florsheim 
Shoe Co. v. United States,l41 the Federal Circuit considered a challenge 
to the President's decision to remove certain items from a list enti-
tling them to preferential treatment under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP).l42 In rejecting the plaintiff's challenge, the 
CAFC held that courts will narrowly review Presidential action taken 
in conformance with delegated legislative authority, adding that 
"[t]he President's findings of fact and the motivation for his action 
are not subject to review."143 One distinguishing and critical feature 
of the Florsheim Shoe case from the Zenith case is that the GSP does not 
provide aggrieved persons any right to judicial review. 
The identical rationale has been employed by the Federal Cir-
cuit under many of the other trade relief statutes in which the Presi-
dent has been given discretionary authority but where Congress has 
made no express provision for judicial review of Presidential action 
taken pursuant to that authority. Thus, in Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. 
United States,l44 the Federal Circuit considered a challenge to the 
scope of relief following an affirmative section 201 escape clause de-
Settlement Agreements in Unfair Trade Cases, 18 INT'L LAw. 683, 686-87 (1984). Through all of 
1986, Commerce concluded only one AD and one CVD suspension agreement. See 51 
Fed. Reg. 1005 (1986) (suspension of the countervailing duty investigation of certain red 
raspberries from Canada based on "an agreement to offset or eliminate all benefits ... 
found to constitute subsidies on exports of certain red raspberries to the United States"); 
Investigation of Canadian Red Raspberries Terminated on Basis of Suspension Agreement, 3 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) at 92 (Jan. 15, 1986); U.S. Japan Reach Five-Year Deal on Chips, Administra-. 
tion Dropping Dumping, § 301 Cases, 3 InCI Trade Rep. (BNA) at 995 (Aug. 6, 1986). 
139 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 604, 98 Stat. 2948, 3025-28 
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 167 I c(a)(2)(B) , 1673c(a)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1985». 
140 19 U.S.C. §§ 167Ic(a)(2)(C), 1673c(a)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1985). 
141 744 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
142 See Comment, Trade Preferences and LDCs: Less Executive Discretion and More Congres-
sional Direction: Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 903 (1984). 
143 744 F.2d at 795. 
144 762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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termination. In upholding the scope of the President's relief deter-
mination, the CAFC stated that it would be improper for a court to 
interfere absent executive branch action beyond the President's dele-
gated authority, quoting Florsheim Shoe's admonition that "the Presi-
dent's findings of fact and the motivations for his action are not 
subject to review."145 As was true under the GSP, section 201 does 
not provide adversely affected parties with a right to judicial review. 
Similarly, in Duracell Inc. v. U.S. International Trade Commission,146 the 
Federal Circuit considered whether Presidential disapprovals under 
section 337 were subject to judicial review. The court concluded 
that it lacked jurisdiction to review a decision of the President disap-
proving an ITC unfair trade practice determination under section 
337(g)(2); that his decision was in effect immune from judicial in-
quiry.l47 There again, however, Congress had not expressly pro-
vided for judicial review of executive branch action taken pursuant to 
section 337(g)(2). 
Finally, in American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v. United States,148 
a challenge was made to Presidential action taken pursuant to section 
204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956 regulating textile imports to the 
United States. The Federal Circuit held that no restrictions could be 
placed on the President's actions so long as they were relevant to the 
enforcement of an existing textile agreement. 149 Section 204 does 
not provide for judicial review of Presidential action taken under that 
law. 
The AD and CVD judicial review provisions of the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, coupled with the sweeping reforms introduced by 
the Customs Courts Act of 1980,150 stand in sharp contrast to the 
foregoing trade relief laws and their absence of judicial review provi-
sions. In enacting the Customs Courts Act of 1980, Congress sought 
to clarify and enlarge the jurisdiction of the CIT's predecessor, the 
Customs Court, in order to enable that court "to render extremely 
expeditious decisions in matters which are important both to our 
country and to our trading partners."151 Perhaps the most impor-
tant of all the reforms introduced by the Customs Courts Act of 1980 
was the enactment of 28 U.S.C. section 1581(c).l52 That section 
145 [d. at 89. 
146 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Duracell case is only one of two reported 
decisions to consider the issue of judicial review of Presidential disapprovals under 19 
U.S.C. § l337(g)(2), the other case being Young Eng'rs, Inc. v. International Trade 
Comm'n, 721 F.2d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
147 Duracell, 778 F.2d at 1580-82. 
148 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
149 [d. at 1247. 
150 Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of Title 28, 
U.S.C.). 
151 S. REP. No. 466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1979). 
152 That section provides that "[t]he Court ofInternational Trade shall have exclusive 
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vests exclusive jurisdiction in the CIT to review AD and CVD admin-
istrative determinations made by the International Trade Commis-
sion (ITC) and the International Trade Administration of the 
Department of Commerce (ITA). In tandem with section 516A of 
the Tariff Act of 1930, which was added by the Trade Agreements 
Act of 1979,153 it empowers the CIT to review a host of determina-
tions made by the ITC and the ITA in the course of an AD and CVD 
investigation. The AD and CVD determinations judicially reviewable 
are: 
(1) a determination by the ITA not to initiate an 
investigation; 154 
(2) an administrative review determination by the ITC or the 
ITA under section 751, 19 U.S.C. section 1675(b);155 
(3) a preliminary determination of no injury by the ITC; 156 
(4) a final determination, either affirmative or negative, by the 
ITC or the ITA under the AD or CVD law;157 
(5) a determination by the ITA to suspend an AD or CVD 
investigation; 158 
(6) an injurious effect determination by the ITC under 19 
U.S.C. sections 1671c(h) or 1673c(h);159 and 
(7) a determination by' the ITA whether a particular type of 
merchandise is within the class or kind of merchandise described in 
an AD or CVD order. 160 
In section 1581(c) cases, CIT review is upon the administrative 
record,161 with the standard of review generally being whether the 
agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record 
considered as a whole, or is otherwise not in accordance with law.'62 
One of Congress' primary purposes in enacting the section 751 
administrative review procedures was to give domestic interested 
parties greater procedural safeguards,163 and its main motive for en-
jurisdiction of any civil action commenced under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 
[19 U.S.C. § 1516a)." 
153 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. as amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 
98-573, § 623. 98 Stat. 2948. 3040. The 1984 amendments to § 516A eliminated most 
interlocutory appeals to the CIT. 
154 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(I)(A) (Supp. III 1985). 
155 [d. § 1516a(a)(I)(B). 
156 [d. § 1516a(a)(I)(C). 
157 [d. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i), (ii) & (iii). 
158 [d. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(v). 
159 [d. 
160 [d. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi). 
161 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(I)(B) (1982); 28 U.S.C. 2640(b) (1982). 
162 [d. With certain preliminary determinations. such as a decision by the ITA not to 
initiate an investigation, the standard of review is whether the agency's decision was arbi-
trary. capricious. an abuse of discretion. or otherwise not in accordance with law. 19 
U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(I)(A) (1982). 
163 S. REP. No. 249. supra note 6. at 81. 
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acting the judicial review provisions of section 516A was to increase 
the opportunities for judicial review of such determinations,164 in-
cluding the determination not to proceed with a section 751 review. The 
CAFC put on judicial blinders when it concluded that because a "set-
tlement" is not a "determination," sections 751 and 516A have no 
applicability.165 Likewise, the CIT's conclusion that section 751 in 
no way modifies section 617's authority to settle antidumping duty 
claims l66 ignored the congressional intent behind the enactment of 
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. Both conclusions allowed the 
Commerce Department to circumvent the strictures of the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 on grounds that amounted to little more 
than administrative convenience. 167 
If Congress had intended such a result then why would it have 
made it the rare case that AD cases be suspended? Even under an AD 
suspension agreement, the exporters of the merchandise under in-
vestigation must either cease exports of the merchandise to the 
United States,168 or revise their prices to eliminate completely the 
margin of dumping. 169 Moreover, the requirement that the affected 
domestic industries be consulted entails "[c]omplete disclosure and 
discussion,"17o not merely pro forma communications. It is incon-
ceivable that Congress could have intended the administrative end 
around achieved in Zenith. While it is true that suspension agree-
ments only take place in the context of an AD "investigation," which 
the Zenith case was not, the spirit of the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979 is that AD findings and orders are generally to be aggressively 
enforced, not compromised or settled. Indeed, an AD investigation 
may be settled under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 only if the 
petitioning American industry withdraws its petition. 171 Consider-
ing the remedial nature of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, it is 
unfortunate that Congress' message concerning the lax enforcement 
of the AD laws under the Treasury Department could be so easily 
forgotten. There can be little doubt that Congress' expectation was 
that the administrative enforcement of the AD laws would be tight-
ened. The Zenith opinions defeated that expectation through their 
cramped reading of congressional intent. 
164 [d. at 244-45. 
165 See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 673 F.2d 1254, 1260 
(C.C.P.A.), C"t. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982). 
166 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1282, 1286-87 (Cl. Int'l Trade 
1981). 
167 See 673 F.2d at 1264. "A tremendous backlog of cases was inherited by the Secre-
tary which may well have interfered with current work of his Department .... " [d. 
168 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(b)(l) (1982). 
169 [d. § 1673c(b)(2) (1982). 
170 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 6, at 71. 
171 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(a) (Supp. III 1985). As noted by Homer & Bello, supra note 
138, at 687, "The legislative history reveals Congress' expectation that investigations be 
terminated only when in the public interest." 
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The CIT was unable or unwilling to find any expression of con-
gressional intent repealing pro tanto section 617.172 But all that is re-
quired is "some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal,"17!! 
not proof of such repeal beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, there 
may be a repeal by implication, although such repeals are not fa-
vored. 174 A statutory provision can be impliedly repealed by a sub-
sequent enactment if the subsequent enactment covers the entire 
subject of the prior provision. In United States v. Allen,175 the 
Supreme Court noted: 
While it is true that repeals by implication are not favored by the 
courts, it is settled that, without express words of repeal, a previous 
statute will be held modified by a subsequent one, if the latter was 
plainly intended to cover the whole subject embraced by both, and 
to prescribe the only rules in respect to that subject that are to 
govern. 176 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 did not purport to supplant the 
entire subject of settling claims arising under the customs laws, but 
that Act did rewrite the rules for terminating and suspending AD 
proceedings. It seems disingenuous to argue, as the CIT did, that 
since sections 751 and 617 serve two different purposes, there was 
no repugnancy between the two provisions. l77 On the contrary, set-
tling a case for a fraction of the dollar with no input from interested 
third parties is certainly inconsistent with a statutory scheme that not 
only obligates the administering agency to consult with interested 
third parties before suspending an investigation, but also accords 
such parties a right to an administrative review of all outstanding AD 
findings and a further right to judicial review of that agency determi-
nation on the merits. That inconsistency is underscored by section 
734(a) of the Trade Agreement Act of 1979,178 the only statutory 
vehicle for settling AD cases under the Act, which requires with-
drawal of the AD petition by the petitioning American industry in 
order to terminate an AD investigation. 179 
Section 751 may not refer to or derogate from section 617 in 
express terms, but at least the former implicitly modifies the latter. 
If it were otherwise, then every AD order and finding subject to sec-
tion 751 review could be forestalled via a section 617 settlement, 
thereby repealing pro tanto not only section 751 but section 516A's 
judicial review provisions as well. It is therefore impossible to read 
sections 751, 516A, and 617, give effect to all three, and still pre-
172 See 509 F. Supp. at 1286-87. 
173 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974). 
174 [d. 
175 163 U.S. 499 (1896). 
176 [d. at 501 (quoting Tracy v. Tuffiy, 134 U.S. 206,223 (1890)). 
177 See 509 F. Supp. at 1287-88. 
178 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(a) (Supp. III 1985). 
179 [d. See Homer & Bello, supra note 138, at 687. 
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serve the sense and purpose of sections 751 and 516A. Under these 
circumstances, the latter provisions in time must prevail,180 particu-
larly where, as here, they treat in far more detail the subject matter 
covered generally in an earlier statute. 181 
IV. Conclusion 
The string of opinions flowing from the Zenith litigation high-
lights the great difficulty American industry has had in obtaining 
meaningful trade relief because of executive branch discretionary 
power. That Zenith and COMPACT came away empty handed was 
not a foregone conclusion. On the contrary, although the courts 
were faced with a congressional delegation of discretionary power to 
the executive branch, a more sympathetic treatment of the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 at the hands of the courts would have re-
sulted at least in a hearing on the merits for Zenith and COMPACT. 
Congress spoke in clear terms when it passed the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979: In the future the administration of antidumping 
duty law is not to be "business as usual." Congress wanted more 
regularity and more predictability in the AD administrative process, 
and less agency discretion. It sought to accomplish these goals by 
enacting more stringent procedural guarantees for domestic inter-
ested parties, including giving them two opportunities to seek judi-
cial review of that administrative process, the first in the CIT, the 
second in the CAFC.182 These goals were frustrated by the courts' 
reluctance to check the executive branch and their willingness to put 
a crabbed gloss on Congress' purpose in enacting the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979. 
180 See Watt v. Alaska. 451 U.S. 259. 268 (1981); 2A C. SANDS. SUTHERLAND ON STAT-
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.02 (1984). 
181 See United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp .• 425 U.S. 164. 168-69 (1976). 
182 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). 
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